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Abstract: This paper focuses on the lack of recognition of comprehensive and text-
genre unrelated translation theories, a condition that keeps translators imprisoned in 
the old and sterile debate on free Vs. literal translation. By challenging two of the 
most common opinions, that is, the presumed existence of legal texts and legal-
translation theories and that of the presumed utility of the notion of free and literal 
translation, this paper underlines the importance of the adoption of a comprehensive 
theory absolutely independent from the classification of the texts to be translated. 
More specifically, Popovič’s semiotics approach to translation gives great space to 
personal interpretation and anisomorphism, hence discarding once and for all the 
concept of faithfulness and equivalence in translation. As I attempt to prove in this 
paper, faithful and objective translations cannot exist, as translation is proved to be a 
subjective act: it is a creative process for which the interpreter is called to give his 
own interpretation on the signs created within the text. 
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SFIDARE IL ESISTENZA DI TRADUZIONE GIURIDICA : UNA 
TEORIA DELLA TRADUZIONE GLOBALE 
 
Abstract: Il presente studio si focalizza sulla mancanza di riconoscimento di teorie 
traduttologiche onnicomprensive e indipendenti dal genere testuale, condizione questa 
che non permette ai traduttori di uscire dall’inutile dibattito su traduzione libera Vs. 
traduzione letterale. Confutando i luoghi comuni sull’asserita legittimità di testi 
giuridici e di teorie della traduzione giuridica da un lato, e sulla presunta utilità delle 
nozioni di traduzione letterale e traduzione fedele dall’altro, il presente paper 
sottolinea l’importanza di fondamenti teorici del tutto indipendenti dalla 
classificazione del testo traducendo. Nello specifico, l’approccio traduttologico 
semiotico di Popovič lascia ampio margine all’interpretazione personale 
e all’anisomorfismo, abbandonando dunque definitivamente i concetti di fedeltà ed 
equivalenza. Come dimostra il presente studio, traduzioni fedeli e oggettive non 
possono esistere, poiché la traduzione stessa è provata essere un atto soggettivo frutto 
d’un processo creativo in cui il soggetto interpretante è chiamato a dare la propria 
interpretazione sui segni contenuti nel testo. 
 
Parole chiave: traduzione giuridica; teoria della traduzione giuridica; traduzione 
letterale; fedeltà; semiotica; Popovič 
KWESTIONUJĄC ISTNIENIE PRZEKŁADU PRAWNICZEGO: 
KU UNIWERSALNEJ TEORII PRZEKŁADU 
 
Abstrakt: Praca dotyczy nieuwzględniania globalnych i nieskoncentrowanych na 
gatunku tekstu teorii przekładu, co prowadzi do uwięzienia tłumacza w niekończącej 
się debacie, jaki rodzaj przekładu stosować tj. przekład wolny czy dosłowny. Autor 
neguje dwie najczęściej wyrażane opinie dotyczące istnienia tekstów prawniczych 
i teorii przekładu prawniczego, wskazując konieczność stosowania globalnej teorii 
przekładu niezależnej od klasyfikacji tekstu do jakiegoś konkretnego gatunku. Autor 
zwraca uwagę, że podejście semiotyczne Popoviča do przekładu pozwala tłumaczowi 
na dokonywanie indywidualnych interpretacji tekstu i rozwiązywania problemu 
anizomorfizmu. W ten sposób raz na zawsze można porzucić dywagacje na temat 
wierności przekładu i ekwiwalencji. W pracy autor stara się udowodnić, że przekład 
wierny i obiektywny nie istnieje, ponieważ proces przekładu jest zawsze aktem 
subiektywnej kreatywności tłumacza-interpretatora.  
 
Słowa klucze: tekst prawny; tekst prawniczy; teorie przekładu prawniczego; 
tłumaczenie literalne; wierność przekładu; semiotyka; Popovič 
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1.  Introduction 
Excluding a few experts of the field, the plethora of professional and 
amateur translators is rarely in the position to follow a solid 
translation theory, as translators continue to be imprisoned in the old 
sterile debate on free vs. literal translation. 
Even supposing translators manage to follow one theory, this 
can seldom be consistently used throughout the text: the vast majority 
of existing translation theories are in fact too often text-genre related 
(there are theories for poetry translation, literary translation, legal 
translation, and so on and so forth), which is a far cry from what 
practitioners need to perform their daily activity. In fact, the 
identification of a text genre can be very difficult, as it “is not 
a polarized dichotomy, but a spectrum that admits blending and 
overlapping” (Cao 2007: 8), as will be later proven in this paper. 
Difficulties in defining the genre of a text may be one of the 
first reasons prompting translators to abandon a particular legal 
translation theory as soon as they are asked to translate a text which 
does not perfectly fit the definition of the genre in question (for 
instance, what text genre does a price breakdown or a medical report 
belong to? Would the answer be the same if their translations were to 
be legally certified?). This paper underlines how current definitions of 
legal texts are detached from the work legal translators do in their 
daily activity and thus create an immense and inadequate gap between 
theory and practice. If text genre is not a precise category to found 
a translation theory, then legal translation theories and text-genre 
related theories are also inadequate. In this regard, things have not 
changed much from what Paul Ricoeur wrote in 1998: “la pratique de 
la traduction reste une operation risquee toujours en quete de sa 
theorie.” (Zaccaria 2000: 9), regardless the large number of translation 
theories existing nowadays
1
. Proving that the definition of text genres 
cannot underpin translation theories, this paper firstly challenges one 
of the most common opinions, that of the presumed existence of legal 
texts and, consequently, legal translation theories. 
By abandoning a scientific theory, translators are often 
tempted to translate choosing the word indicated as more suitable in 
                                                        
1See for instance Alcaraz Varò and Hughes 2002. 
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the context by a dictionary or, even more frequently, just following 
their heart with no scientific foundation whatsoever. On the one side, 
this lack of scientific precision makes translation being perceived as 
an unworthy, unprofitable artistic activity, on the other side this makes 
translators being continuously imprisoned in the never-ending debate 
on free vs. literal translation. When a translator is not able to make up 
his mind on the word to choose, he might just decide to play it safe 
and to “stick to the text and translate it literally”, a phrase probably 
sounding as a captivating mantra, a cliché translator can rely on in 
times of need (“[…] lawyers and linguists tend to tether themselves to 
the pole of literalism”, as Wolff notes 2011: 228). 
The second common opinion this paper challenges is the 
presumed utility of literal translation, which based on the fact that the 
very notion of literality has no meaning at all, I want to definitely 
prove to be useless. 
In this analysis, it is posited that a more general and 
comprehensive translation theory can and should hence be used, 
whilst the old notions of free and literal translation, as well as the text-
genre related approach, should be both abandoned. Popovič’s theory 
on translation will be tested and applied to different excerpts of 
random texts in different languages (e.g. Mandarin, English, Italian) in 
order to prove the solidity and efficiency of his theoretical framework 
in the practical act of translation. Such theory not only underlines the 
scientific value of translation as a creative act, but it also perfectly 
recreates the interior and cognitive process the translator follows when 
translating, leading us to abandon the concept of faithfulness and 
equivalence in translation – surely challenged many times by scholars, 
but never truly left aside by practitioners. 
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2.  Against common opinions 
2.1  Against the presumed existence of legal texts 
Misbeliefs are not only typical of non-specialists, but of specialists 
alike. They dangerously lead experts and non-experts of the field to 
false assumptions which may interfere with the most practical aspects 
of the profession. They may also be a far cry from what practitioners 
need to know to perform their daily activity. If we take a look at what 
is currently said on legal translation, we realize that there are major 
differences between existing translation theories and definitions of 
legal texts provided for by scholars. This clearly prevents practitioners 
to make use of a solid and single theory, which may be of help in 
doing their job, regardless of the text they are to translate. 
Scholars have not reached an agreement on how to define 
a “legal text”. If we consider most recent works written to this 
purpose, a first important question should come to our mind: why 
would we need a definition of “legal text” at all? Wolff (2011: 233) 
admits that no one has offered a comprehensive and distinctive 
definition of what constitutes a legal text so far, a premise which 
would be arguably useful to those in seek of a legal-translation theory. 
It should be frustrating for these definition-seekers to find out that the 
anxiety in defining a field of study does not affect exponents of many 
other fields. Physicians do not keep wondering what is medicine, 
except when it comes, for instance, to some ethical issue and 
distinction between medical care and futile medical care is needed. 
Perhaps, there is no need to treat legal translation as a specific 
area
2
, in opposition to Garzone’s stance that the language of the law 
has distinctive qualities that “[…] marks it off from ordinary language 
and makes it a case apart even in the field of special languages” 
(Garzone 2000: 1; see also: Tiersma 2000: 2). And why would this 
be? If we take a look at the following random excerpt from a 
colloquial speech between teenagers of a British TV series, we get an 
                                                        
2As noted by Harvey (2002: 177), this may hide a vein of socio-professionalism 
haughtiness. 
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idea of how colloquial speech cannot be said to be easy at all, and how 
it is similarly “marked off” from any other kind of language: 
Homo! - Yeah, because I rule, basically Shit bender./Ah, Kelly, you’re 
stankin’! What about you, you sweaty fuck! Aargh! Get away, you 
scummer./Later then! What you think of that, then? Tone?/What? Think of 
what?/The moves. Me, Jonno and Kel worked it out./It’s OK./Hey! Nothing to 
worry about, dude./Yeah?/ Yeah./It’s all right./Everything’s cool./- Hi, 
Maxxie./- Hey./Hi./Who’s that?/That’s Tony./What’s up with you?/ I had 
a traumatic subdural haematoma with motor and perceptional 
complications./Are you mental?/ Yes./I’d still give you one./Totally./He’s 
well fit./Yeah, Queenie?/ Yeah./He’s buff./Hey come on, Tone./See you later, 
girls./See you Maxxie!/ Bye!/ I wanna give Maxxie one./You can’t. He’s 
homosexual./Bummer.//See? I remembered your favourite./Thanks./You’ve 
grown, Tony./And there’s another two inches in you, easy./How’s your Mum? 
- I don’t remember you./Oh, well./We used to have lovely chats when I was 
cleaning your mum’s place./You were such a clever little lad./I’m stupid 
now./No./Here you go, mate./Thanks, Mum./Oh, we used to giggle./Well, you 
never did know what your mum was going to say next./Ketchup, Mum? - 
Yeah, right./Bloody hilarious jokes she told./Filthy./Oh, a right laugh, your 
mum.//Mum? I need to pee./I can manage it myself usually./Yeah, sorry./Oh, 
fucking fucking fucking thing! Oh! Ooh./Oooh! Ooh la la! Yee-ha! Oi, look 
out./Here comes Batty Boy./You wanna watch it, Dale./He’ll slip you a big fat 
cock! No fucking way, man! Cockety-cock-cock! […]. 
(“Skins s02e01 Episode Script | SS” 2015) 
Does this mean that we need a colloquial-informal speech theory? One 
may argue that colloquial language is a case apart, since it may 
include teenagers’ slang, phrasal verbs and other forms of figurative 
language, which contribute to mark this language off from languages 
of other fields. However, there is no solid proof for such 
differentiation, as the same goes for medical language, chemistry 
language, physics language, astronomy language, and so on and so 
forth: they are all “marked off” from each other, and they have 
features and intended meanings different from those we find in 
“ordinary language” 3. 
                                                        
3Also, if “legal language” is said to be marked off from ordinary language, then we 
need to define “ordinary language” as well. It cannot just be defined as “every day 
language” or “the language you speak at home”, as one may speak of many things at 
home, and the language used with friends is certainly different with that used with 
one’s spouse, or with acquaintances, or with that used lullabying to our baby or, even 
more, with that used by a 3-year-old child. 
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Šarčević (1997: 9; quoted by Harvey 2002: 178) defines legal 
language as the language used by experts of the field, thus 
unjustifiably ignoring texts between experts and non-experts, and text 
used in a legal context. These interpretations of the concept of “legal” 
prevent other kind of texts, including sworn translations in general 
(e.g. birth certificates, degree certificates, medical reports, price 
breakdown), texts between lawyers and non-lawyers (e.g. students) 
and pieces of evidence used in legal proceedings (e.g. suicide notes; 
Harvey 2002: 178), from being treated with a legal-translation theory, 
whereas everyone who made an attempt at translating them surely 
realized they are “as much legal as” a Power of Attorney is. 
Classification of texts according to their destination or context 
of use opened the door to functional theories, whose advocates may 
assume that legal texts are texts to be used for legal purposes
4
, and/or 
producing legal effects, which is what Koutsivitis and Gémar (both 
quoted in Harvey 2002: 179) affirm, along with Garzone (2000: 1), 
who treats texts with no legal validity as non-authentic texts. Again, 
a textbook relating to corporate law does not produce any legal 
effects, neither a contract between two parties necessarily does to a 
third party, but nobody would ever dare to consider them differently 
from legal texts. 
Intuitively, Cao (2007: 8) recognizes the difficulties in 
defining text genre and states that this “[…] is not a polarized 
dichotomy, but a spectrum that admits blending and overlapping, 
a question of quality and intensity, […]”. This statement can be easily 
proved as correct. In my work as a certified translator, I often happen 
to translate summons/claim forms. Nobody has doubts in saying that 
a summons is a legal text (if not, then what is?). Italian civil summons 
(“atti di citazione”) are normally divided into eight parts: 1.) an 
introductory part stating who is the claimant (“attore”) and who is/are 
the lawyer(s) acting on his behalf and on his interest; 2.) a part stating 
who is the defendant (“convenuto”); 3.) a description of the relevant 
facts (“in punto di fatto”) based on which the claimant is summoning 
the defendant; 4.) a part in which facts under point 3.) are analysed 
and considered from a legal perspective (“in punto di diritto”) by 
explaining how these facts constitute an infringement and a violation 
                                                        
4This is what I, too, used to believe, and what I affirmed in my paper titled «Anxiety 
in defining the role of translator: court translators in Italy» I presented at the 
Translation Talk Conference (23-24 April 2015, London), and which I no longer 
consider correct. 
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of the plaintiff’s rights; 5.) a section where terms and deadlines for the 
defendant to file his entry of appearance (“costituzione in giudizio”) 
are indicated; 6.) a part where the plaintiff explains what kind of 
reliefs are sought; 7.) the economic value of the proceeding; 8.) the 
Power of Attorney by virtue of which the plaintiff empowered his 
attorneys at law. In the summons I am referring to, the plaintiff 
accused the defendant of having sold a counterfeit pair of shoes, 
whose design was deemed by the plaintiff to be his own property – 
and thus the alleged imitation would have constituted an infringement 
of the plaintiff’s property right. Of this 20-page summons, part 3.) 
occupies 10 pages: thus basically 50% of the whole summons is 
a fact-description telling the prestige of the plaintiff, the design of the 
shoes in question and that of other similar shoes, point of sales where 
the shoes were sold, facts and figures on the sale, expert’s report on 
the comparison of the two designs, and so on and so forth. Very rarely 
do we meet “legal” words in this part – and the same goes for part 3.) 
of the vast majority of the summons. Nonetheless, the summons in 
question is “legal” and was used to produce legal effects. 
Consequently, we must admit that texts are not defined in genre from 
the number of genre-related words they include, but from the meaning 
they create by making use of these words. Words are nothing but one 
of the many devices humankind can use to shape meaning, which is 
partially created by the author by means of words, and partially 
reconstructed by the reader’s skills and possibility to understand the 
author’s intended meaning according to the purposes for which the 
text was written. Thus, meaning can be eventually said to be “legal”: 
not texts, nor words. This implies that the reader is at the very core of 
the meaning, as meaning is not solely within the text, but it has to be 
created by the reader in his mind: the reader is the interpreter 
interpreting the meaning within the text and understanding it. And in 
fact, Harvey (2002: 178) had to admit that “General statements about 
legal translation are necessarily determined by the writer’s definition 
of a legal document.”, clearly introducing the concept of subjectivity 
and giving space to personal interpretation, which is at the core of 
Popovič’s comprehensiv5 theory supported in this paper. Additionally, 
words are not the only device creating meaning, other devices also 
                                                        
5By comprehensive translation theory I mean a text genre and language unrelated 
theory, thus a theory that can be used to any text, regardless its function, context of 
use, and alleged genre categorization. 
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create it. Font does. Punctuation does. Typographic emphasis does. 
Context does. And also graphical elements such as tables, seals, fiscal 
stamps, signatures, they all contribute to construe meaning. Then why 
do people keep stressing the importance of word-for-word translation? 
2.2  The literalists’ creed: “I believe in literality, the 
Father almighty” 
An Italian sworn translator needing to certify his own translation can 
do it by swearing it before a court officer and declaring in an affidavit 
he had “correctly and faithfully performed his task at the sole aim of 
revealing the truth”6. Similarly, putting it at a more international level, 
the World Education Services (WES) still requires that translators 
provide “[…] precise, word-for-word, English translations […]7.”And 
this is exactly what non-specialists ask for to a translator: a literal, 
word-for-word, faithful translation objectively revealing the truth of 
a text. 
Even though experts in translation studies can confirm what 
Steiner (1998: 319) already claimed on the religious concept of 
fidelity in translation as generating a sterile debate
8
,
 
such statements 
clearly show how most of the people continue to look at translation as 
a process being accurate and precise only if literally done – as if the 
concept of “literal translation” meant anything at all. On the contrary, 
I affirm that the debate between free and literal translation has no 
implications, as it is totally meaningless, since the concept of “literal” 
itself is meaningless. 
What does “literal” exactly mean, after all? If we are to think 
of “literal” as intending “letter by letter”, thus rescuing its etymology, 
                                                        
6Courtesy translation of the Italian version of the affidavit, usually going as follows: 
“[…] Ammonito il comparente sull'importanza del giuramento, il medesimo ha 
pronunciato la formula: “giuro di avere bene e fedelmente adempiuto l'incarico 
affidatomi al solo scopo di far conoscere la verità. […].” 
7A similar example was used almost 10 years ago by Šarčević (1997: 16), quoted by 
(Harvey 2002: 181) Unfortunately, it looks like 10 years of research and efforts by 
scholars of different fields in trying to change this conception didn’t alter the common 
opinion. 
8Check for instance (Seidman 2010: 73) and (Kasirer 2001: 339).  
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then the meaning of a word such as “term” would be the meaning 
resulting from the meaning of its letters, thus t+e+r+m: but “t” has no 
meaning, and so have “e”, “r” and “m”. Literal meaning does not 
exist. But when we read “term”, we do intend its meaning. And if we 
read it in a context, we may understand it as having another meaning. 
We are used to think of words has having a primary meaning -its 
literal one- plus other acceptations. But this is only because we are 
used to it. We are convinced that this is the way words function. 
Nonetheless, there may be no primary meaning at all (who decides a 
word primary meaning?), and only acceptations. If we look up the 
word “term” in a monolingual dictionary, we find a numbered list of 
equally worthy acceptations. How to establish a word’s literal 
meaning? I cannot think of any other way to establish it but relying on 
the first explanation listed and generally representing the most 
common and frequent meaning. If so, then “literal” would not mean “a 
word’s intrinsic meaning”, but just “the most frequent meaning 
according to the vast majority of monolingual dictionaries”. Taking it 
a step forward, we should note that dictionaries are not carved in 
stone, and that they are all different one from each other: they are in 
fact written by people, so word choices and consequently the list of 
acceptations depends on the author(s)’ subjective opinion and, again, 
interpretation. 
So, why do people keep stressing the importance of words and 
word-for-word translation? The straight answer is: because it’s easier. 
Although less profitable, it is obviously easier thinking of a text -being 
it written or spoken- in terms of countable, tangible words, rather than 
in terms of abstract, possible, multiple, and often hidden and implied 
meanings. While smart attorneys usually charge flat rates or hourly 
rates according to the complexity of the case, and the experience and 
success they have in the field, translators (with some few remarkable 
exceptions) charge low rates
9
 according to the number of words they 
translate, thus proving to their clients that their job requires nothing 
                                                        
9We should all thank literalists for this great unprofitable choice, which resulted in 
translators spending their time on social networks or writing blogs (e.g. 
https://nopeanuts.wordpress.com) to convince their colleague to stop charging 
incredibly low rates. 
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but dealing with words and mechanically
10
 converting them into 
another language. 
Despite the literalists’ creed, literal translation cannot simply 
exist. Strict literal translation can result only in unintelligible texts, 
especially when it comes to natural phrases and not to short unnatural 
sentences. Although this should have been common sense, it can be 
further proved with some examples. First of all, how to literally 
translate articles in languages that do not have them? If I say “I don’t 
want a book, I want the book”, how can we translate it into Chinese? 
Chinese does not have articles: does this mean that the Chinese are 
incapable of expressing or even understanding the difference between 
a generic book and a specific one? Let us now consider the following 
case: 
a.) Italian version: 
CLAUSOLA PENALE. In caso di esecuzione oltre la Data Termine di 
Installazione Offshore indicata nel Piano d’Esecuzione per il quale 
l’Appaltatore è unicamente responsabile, l’Appaltatore è tenuto 
a corrispondere alla Società una penale pari ad un quarto (0,25%) del 
prezzo iniziale per ogni giorno di ritardo, fino ad un massimo del 
10%. 
b.) English very “literal” (and faithful?) translation11: 
CLAUSE PENAL. In case of execution beyond the Date Term of 
Installation Offshore indicated in the Plan of Execution of the what 
the Contractor is exclusively responsible, the Contractor is obligated 
to reciprocate to the Company a penalty equal to a quarter (0.25%) of 
the price initial for each day of delay, up to a maximum of 10%. 
c.) English less “literal” (and less faithful?) translation12: 
PENAL CLAUSE. In case of execution beyond the Term Date of 
Offshore Installation indicated in the Execution Plan for which the 
Contractor is exclusively responsible, the Contractor is obligated to 
                                                        
10Should mechanical translation (MT) be really possible, dictionary-based machine 
translation would give perfect result; on the contrary, good results are possible when 
human translation serves as corpora to MT. 
11According to what I demonstrated in this section of the paper, the literal translation 
in question was done by choosing the first translation listed in the bilingual dictionary 
(“Dizionario Di Inglese - Il Vocabolario Di Traduzioni Online - La Repubblica” 
2015). 
12Translation done by maintaining the translation of the words found in the same 
dictionary as above, but improving -at least partially- the English grammar and 
syntax. 
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reciprocate to the Company a penalty equalling to a quarter (0.25%) of 
the initial price for each day of delay, up to a maximum of 10%. 
d.) English “free” (unfaithful?) translation: 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. In the event of a delay to the Offshore 
Installation Completion Date as per the Contract Schedule for which 
Contractor is solely responsible, Contractor shall pay Liquidated 
Damages to Company at a rate of a quarter of a per cent (0.25%) per 
day of delay, subject to a maximum of ten per cent (10%) of the Initial 
Contract Price.
 
(“Example Clause – Liquidated Damages” 2015) 
 
For no good reason, translation under point d.) can be proved to be 
incorrect or imprecise. Apart from being more natural and 
grammatically correct, that translation also better represents the legal 
meaning expressed by text under point a.). Among the many 
differences we can note between the two, the striking difference 
resides in the name of the clause – “clausola penale” in the Italian 
version, “penal clause” in the half-way-literal translation, and 
“liquidated damages” in the “free” translation. “Clausola penale” in 
the Italian legal context is regulated by paragraphs 1382-1384 of the 
Italian Civil Code. Whoever has some knowledge in the field would 
recognize the great difference between a “penalty clause” (of which 
“penal clause” may lead us to think) and a “liquidated damages 
clause”. They are in fact two completely different concepts, which are 
treated differently both in Common Law countries and in Civil Law 
countries. A “penalty clause” is «A provision in a contract that 
stipulates an excessive pecuniary charge against a defaulting party.» 
and «Courts do not generally enforce such a clause […].» 
(“Yourdictionary.com” 2015). This is not what “clausola penale” 
means, but what a “clausola vessatoria” may eventually imply. 
Henceforth, being a “clausola penale” generally established by mutual 
agreement of the parties, and being it equitable, it is better translated 
by the “liquidated damages clause” phrase. 
While literalists may believe that literal translation does exist, 
I can further prove this statement to be wrong by adding an example 
relating to a language that does not make use of Latin alphabet: 
Chinese. If literalists may affirm that “clausola penale” can be literally 
translated as “penal clause” or “penalty clause”, just because the two 
words are etymologically related and/or because “penalty” is the first 
choice they come up with when looking up “penale” in a bilingual 
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dictionary, what can they say about the literal translation of a word 
such as <dangshiren 当事人>? If we are looking at this word 
graphically, we will obviously not find anything similar in languages 
using an alphabet. If we consider it from its pronunciation, and 
provided that we use its pinyin transcription, we end up reading it 
dang shi ren, which again does not help us in finding its allegedly 
existing literal translation. So, what are we to do to find it? If the 
answer is “checking up a dictionary”, then this equals to say that we 
are asking a person or a group of people (i.e. the dictionary’s 
author(s)) how they interpret that word. Such authors are hence other 
translators who created a glossary (i.e. the dictionary we are checking 
up) based on the experience they have of that word, or of other 
translations of the same word done by other translators. There is no 
literal meaning within a word. Meaning is created in the mind of the 
interpreter who reads/hears the word. In the example analysed above, 
“penale” does not mean “penal” or “penalty”, and not even “criminal” 
(as it could be the case with “Codice Penale”, being it “Criminal 
Code”), not because of the letters it contains, but because of its 
intended meaning in such a context. Studying the context to decide 
how to translate a word -or a group of words- should not be the 
exception, but the rule. 
From what has been analysed above, we can first conclude 
that words do not have an intrinsic and literal meaning, but rather than 
the meaning is always implied.  
3.  A comprehensive translation theory 
Faithfulness goes hand in hand with the concept of equivalence, which 
for obvious reasons has been at the very core of religious and legal 
text, and consequently legally-oriented translation studies. As pointed 
out by Harvey (2002: 180), «The debate over fidelity to the “letter” or 
the “spirit” in legal translation is a long-standing one, dating back to 
the days of the Roman empire when it was decreed that formal 
correspondence between source and target text was essential to 
preserve the meaning of both Biblical and legal documents (Gémar 
1995a: 26-30, Šarčević 1997: 23-48).» 
Michele MANNONI: Challenging the existence … 
112 
Some scholars, notably those from East-Europe, affirmed that 
there is no such thing as faithful translation: there are, in fact, only 
imprecise and non-perfect translations (Lûdskanov 1967; Popovič 
1975; Torop 1995), a concept which elegantly tosses aside the 
problem of faithfulness. To this purpose, Popovič created two new 
words replacing Catford’s “source text” and “target text”, thus 
sweeping away the idea of translation as a voyage and, speaking more 
properly, the concept of translation as replacement of words of one 
code with those of another. Popovič’s ideas of “prototext” and 
“metatext” came hence to life, thus revealing that translation is not 
a journey: it is in fact a communication process involving signs and 
creating a brand new text (i.e. a secondary text, a meta-text)
13
, of 
which the translator is the sole creative author. 
Lûdskanov’s great merit consists in having clearly affirmed 
what Jakobson vaguely implied in his studies, and that is that 
translation must be studied from the semiotics perspective (1967: 26). 
He defines a sign as an “object indicating another object” (ibidem; 
translation mine). More precisely, Lûdskanov uses Shaff’s words to 
explain this process: “any real object (its real aspect and its 
characteristics) becomes a sign when it is used in the communication 
process to convey information relating to facts, thoughts, emotions or 
will.” (quoted in ibidem; translation mine). Combining Lûdskanov and 
Sharff’s notions of “sign”, and how meaning is shaped, we note that 
a sign can be created by a word or a sound
14
, or by anything we can 
hear or see (or both hear and see at the same time): the same goes for 
group of words or sounds to which we attribute meaning. 
All the images and possible meanings arising in our mind 
when we see/hear that sign are what Sausurre and Peirce call the 
interpretant; what is in fact meant by that sign in that specific context 
                                                        
13This was similarly and more recently stated, in other words, by House (2009: 3), 
who defines translation as “the replacement of an original text with another text” 
(emphasis added.) 
14Languages/cultures have sounds, symbols or gestures which similarly to written and 
oral texts may be translated. For example, Italians make use of sounds which 
generally are not listed in the IPA symbols used to transcribe Italian phonemes, nor 
are they reported in dictionaries: they consists in an affricate click sound which may 
means “no” (if lips are in their neutral position) or it may be a sound use to catch the 
attention of a cat. Another example of sound not listed in dictionaries is car horn: it 
does have a meaning -or even multiple meanings- (e.g. “Hi mate!”, if you want to say 
hello to a friend of yours, or “Attention!” if you want to catch another’s driver 
attention to let him brake.) 
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is the object. All this process is everything but unique and objective: 
in fact, it varies dramatically under two factors: a.) subjectivity; b.) 
anisomorphism. The interpretant varies according to the person (i.e. 
the interpreter) who is actually processing the sign in his mind, 
because his culture, his own experiences, his own view of the world, 
are different than those of any other person
15
. This is very much 
culturally-influenced, which is why one may also look at this 
phenomena in terms of anisomorphism, being it the property of 
different languages using different signs to refer to same thing (which 
was also proved by Sapir and Whorf in their famous hypothesis.) 
When one reads “tree” or hear the sound /tri:/, the ideas coming to our 
minds are not the same for all of us. The tree one may be used to see 
or to play with when s/he was a kid might be completely different than 
the one other people used to see, because different countries have 
different trees, or because even within the same country trees vary 
according to where they grow. So a tree is not just a tree. According 
to the idea a speaker of one language can have of a tree, the translator 
may in fact be in need of finding a new sign in the other language he 
is translating into, a sign that is not usually translated with the word 
“tree”. 
What happens when it comes to legal words? Is a hetong 合同 
a contract, or is it an agreement? Or is it a pact? And is dangshi ren 
当事人 a party, two parties, or the parties to a contract? And what about 
zeren 责任? Is it responsibility or liability? Popovič and Lûdskanov 
answer to all these questions and the one I discussed in the previous 
sections by proposing a general translation theory illustrated as 
follows: 
 
                                                        
15Creativity in legal translation has been discussed, among the others, by Šarčević 
(2000). 
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Picture No. 1: Popovič’s translation theory 
 
(Popovič 1975: 37) 
 
The prototext (P) is the primary text: P is created in a cultural tradition 
(Tc1) to which it belongs to by its author (Ap), who had in mind 
a Receiver (R1), and it is divulgated and shaped by a sender reality 
(Re1). Besides the possible model reader, R1 can be any other reader 
who happens to read/listen P. All this creates what Popovič refers to 
as the primary communication, that is to say, the protocommunication. 
R1 is just one of the possible readers who is going to decode the signs 
within P and recode them (Lûdskanov 1967: 50-52) by using devices 
(not necessarily consisting in words) of another code/language. When 
M is the translation of P, R1 = Am.  
So, how to translate P into M? Somewhere else, in the reality 
(Re2) of another cultural tradition (Tc2), where another language is 
spoken, the translator is to find a text as similar as possible to P (hence 
another metatext created by a different Am), to which the translated 
text (the metatext sensu stricto) must be compared to. The most 
similar text(s) to P one can find in the Re2 are what Osimo (2004: 
126) defines as “parallel texts”16: 
 
                                                        
16Despite Sin-Wai Chang (2014: 509), among the many others, has recently used the 
term “comparable texts” as a wider category than “parallel texts”, by “parallel text” I 
intend the Osimo’s old acceptation, that is to say “two texts relating to the same 
field/genre”. “Comparable texts” turns out to be an imprecise term, as any text can be 
said to be comparable -at least to some extent- to another. 
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Picture No. 2: Parallel texts 
 
(Popovič 1975, 37) 
3.1  Practical applications of Popovič’s translation theory 
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. It is now easy to 
understand that faithful and objective translations cannot exist, as 
translation is a subjective act: it is a very creative process for which 
the interpreter is called to give his own personal interpretation on the 
signs created within the text so to decode and recode them into 
another language. The M cannot be thought to be the same text as P, 
since M is a brand new text assuming -in the best scenario- just almost 
the same meaning (Eco 2003) Translation is hence a non-repeatable 
process, which is why back translation never brings to light the same 
P from which its M was created, and the reason why two identical 
translations do not and will never exist (not even if done by the same 
author). What Harvey (2002: 180) affirms by using Hammond’s 
words is true: a translator is not a bilingual typist; he is a text 
producer. Translators combine artistic creativity with scientific 
research and the study of at least two cultures (including in this term 
not only the so called “human sciences”, but also the “technical-
scientific sciences”). 
Ambiguity is not the exception: it is the rule. And translators 
cannot be asked to maintain it in translation, since -as I underlined 
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before- the work of a translator necessary implies -willing or not- 
interpreting signs to rescue the intrinsic meaning of a text (thus 
choosing one meaning among the possible ones intended.) Also, the 
number of meanings is not language-related, but it varies according to 
the language on which the act of translation is performed (1967: 28). 
It is quite impossible to find out if “hetong 合同” intends a contract 
(≈ “contratto”)17, an agreement (≈ “accordo”), or a deed (≈ “atto 
pubblico”) in a Chinese dictionary, whether these 
acceptations/meanings of the word “hetong” must be taken into 
account if translating from Mandarin Chinese into Italian. 
A few practical examples can be further used to prove what 
I have been affirming so far. It is worth underlining at this point that 
what follows are not specific examples created ad hoc to prove my 
thesis right. On the contrary, Popovič’s translation model can be seen 
in every translation process (even in wrong translation, where the 
translator chose the wrong parallel text). 
I affirmed in paragraph 2.1 that signs in a text are created not 
only by means of words, but by any other visual element added to it. 
A formal document may have many graphical elements; it can, for 
instance, look like this: 
 
Picture No. 3: Agreement 
 
(http://www.sunderlandcitycouncil.com/friendship/images/agreement2
.jpg; retrieved on 15/06/2015) 
 
When translating the last lines of such a page we can choose what we 
want our M to look like: if we are not stating in our translation that the 
P was signed by the parties and that there are two emblems, we are 
                                                        
17≈ means “is approximately equal to”. 
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creating an imprecise translation. A “precise, word-for-word, faithful 
translation” would thus neglect the emblems, and provided that the 
two signatures above are basically illegible, would ignore them. But if 
we go look for the meaning of this document and its legal value, we 
must admit that a written agreement is legally valid if an agreements is 
reached at least by two parties and hence if they sign the written 
document. Henceforth, we cannot but recognize the importance of the 
two signatures and the two emblems relating to the parties: I would 
hence translate them “[signed: illegible signature] [emblem]” (using 
italics and squared brackets to let my reader understand that this is not 
something found in brackets in the P, but a device I used to recode 
into the M what I have found in the P). This shows how meaning is 
not only provided by words, but by any other sign existing in a text 
(including, as I said before, signs created via graphic elements). 
Another interesting example can be excerpted from Section 
VII of the Chinese Contract Law (Hetong Fa 合同法; hereinafter 
“HTF”)18, titled weiyue zeren 违约责任. To know how to translate 
zeren, what the interpreter does is generally checking up a bilingual 
dictionary (which equals asking another person how he generally 
translates the word, as said above), and then picking up one of the 
translations listed there, assuming that the first is the most literal, 
whilst the last is the freest and usually most relating to idiomatic 
expressions. On the contrary, a good interpreter investigates all the 
elements creating the Primary Communication: the HTF is a P written 
by one (or more) author(s) experts in laws (probably lawyers), who 
can be reasonably thought to be the most expert practitioners in such 
field. Do they choose the phrase weiyue zeren according to a Tc1 or 
did they intentionally use a new phrase? To check this, I would google 
the phrase and see how many and what kind of hits I obtain: I obtained 
755,000 hits, and the phrase is listed in most common websites and 
digital encyclopaedia. I proved my hypothesis by googling the phrase 
in Google Books, and obtained 143,000 hits: the phrase was not 
invented by the Ap to convey something exceptional to their intended 
recipient (R1), nor is it a rare phrase. From the theoretical perspective, 
this kind of research means applying Popovič’s translation theory by 
studying the Tc1 and entering the author’s mind to interpret the sign 
                                                        
18I consulted the bilingual version by (Formichella and Toti 2014), so to compare my 
translation with theirs (to read a specific study on such a comparison, please refer to 
(Mannoni 2015) ) 
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they intended to create. The best explanation of a sign is its 
explanation in the same language used to create it
19
: 
«违约责任也称为违反合同的民事责任，是指合同当事人因不履行合同义务或
者履行合同义务不符合约定，而向对方承担的民事责任» (“[weiyue zeren], 
also referred to as “weifan hetong”, indicates the “zeren” a party has 
toward the other party in case of defective performance of an 
obligation or breach of contractual terms.”; translation mine) 
(http://baike.baidu.com/view/299861.htm; retrieved on 16/06/2015). 
The excerpts make us understand that the kind of zeren in 
question (generally translated as responsibility) relates to the wei 违 
(“violation”) of a yue 约 (“contract/agreement”). This zeren is called 
in English “liability for breach of contract”, from which we can infer 
the most accurate translation of wei (“breach”) and yue (“contract”) in 
this case. Parallel texts in this example were P and all the hits having 
the same intended meaning as P I found on Google for the Chinese on 
the one side, and -in absence of a Civil Code for most of the English 
speaking countries- tort laws and similar hits. 
Identifying a good parallel text to the P to translate it into 
Italian is even easier, since Italy is a civil law country and does have 
a Civil Code containing -among the other things- provisions relating 
to contracts and agreements. We just need to check art. 789 and art. 
1218 to understand Italian makes use of the word “responsabilità” 
both to refer to liability and responsibility. By looking for other 
parallel texts in Google Books we can find many studies on the 
“responsabilità per inadempimento” also called “responsabilità 
contrattuale”, which can then be deemed as correct 
translations/interpretations of the phrase in P. 
Since Popovič’s translation theory needs parallel texts to be 
brought about, when texts whose function is most similar to the P do 
not contain any useful term or phrase expressing the intended meaning 
we want to convey, this may be because the very concept we are at 
does not exist in the M culture. This is often the case when texts have 
                                                        
19This is true for at least 2 consequent reasons: (1) we think in a language which 
Lûdskanov defines “internal language” (hereinafter: L0), hence when we speak and 
we use our mother tongue (L1) we are basically performing a translation from L0 to L1 
(Lûdskanov 1967, XIII-XV); (2) since as Popovič affirms translation is a kind of 
communication process, and since every communication implies a residual of 
meaning which gets lost in the verbalisation process, translating from L0 to L1 implies 
loosing some part of the meaning. Consequently, the same goes for bilingual 
dictionaries. 
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to be translated from a P culture with a certain legal system into a M 
culture with a different one (e.g.: civil law to common law) – but the 
same goes for many other words typical of the so-called “everyday” 
language (e.g. tofu is just tofu, and its Sino-Japanese pronunciation 
was imported as such into European languages because there is 
nothing one can compare it to in Western M-cultures). If we take for 
instance a legal document such as the Italian “Atto di Precetto”, it 
does not have a precise word or phrase in Mandarin to translate it 
with, since the very functioning of the lawsuit process is different in 
the two countries. What is an “Atto di Precetto”? Let us see first how 
the phrase is structured so to understand what is the sign created by 
the words. “Atto” is etymologically related to the word “azione” 
(action) and thus the verb “agire” (to act). Its past participle “atto” 
(“acted”) is used as a name in legal jargon both to refer to formal 
documents used in a lawsuit (hence “Atto” can be sometimes 
translated into English as “document”, “legal document” or 
“instrument”), and -from a legal doctrine perspective- to refer to 
actions having legal value. In Mandarin, each of these acceptations 
would imply different translations. A document can be a wenjian 文件, 
but documents in lawsuits (such as a Power of Attorney, or a 
Summons) are generally referred to as shu 书 and zhuang 状 (e.g.: a 
POA is shouquan shu 授权书, whilst a summons is a qisu zhuang 
起诉状). “Precetto” -out of the lawsuit process- means a religious 
precept, a maxim or teaching, and hence order, which is the 
acceptation the word has in “Atto di Precetto”. Let us now turn to the 
function of such document in the Italian culture so to fully understand 
the semiotic value of the phrase in the P culture. When at the last stage 
of debt recovery an Italian judge has already ruled that debtor has to 
repay his debt to creditor and sentenced debtor to promptly perform 
his obligations
20
, but debtor is still unwilling to do so, creditor’s 
lawyer can write a formal document (i.e. the Atto di Precetto) to order 
for the last time the debtor to ‘spontaneously’ repay the debt within 10 
days (art. 480, par. I, Italian Code of Civil Procedure). Failure to 
perform will result in the attachment of debtor’s property. Henceforth, 
the Atto di Precetto is the final invitation to debtor to perform by 
virtue of a instrument -being it judicial or extrajudicial- creating an 
executable right (art. 474, par. I, Italian Code of Civil Procedure). One 
                                                        
20As well as under other circumstances provided for by law under art. 474, par. II of 
the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. 
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of the best parallel text that can be of help when translating Italian 
judicial documents -that are regulated by the Italian Code of Civil 
Procedure- is certainly the Law of Civil Procedure of PRC (Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法; 
hereinafter LCP). According to art. 224 LCP, creditor’s attorney can 
request the Court to execute the judgment, and there is no way for the 
attorney to directly order the debtor to pay the debt bypassing the 
Court itself. Henceforth, since PRC makes no use of documents 
similar to the “Atto di Precetto” or “Atto di Precetto su Sentenza” 
(Order to Perform by virtue of Judgement), one can invent a brand 
new phrase explicating the meaning/functioning of the P (e.g.: panjue 
zhixing shu 判决执行书: document to execute a judgement)21. 
4.  Conclusions 
Text-genre related translation theories have long influenced amateur 
and professional translators, leading them to support false 
assumptions. This paper made an attempt at dismantling two 
interrelated common opinions and introducing Popovič’s 
comprehensive theory as a solid alternative for translators throughout 
the world. Firstly, the paper made an attempt at dismantling the 
presumed existence of legal texts, showing that the reason why 
scholars have not reached an agreement on what “legal texts” can be 
defined as relies on the fact that the definition of legal texts itself is 
based on the personal definition of “legal” (Harvey 2002: 178), and 
text-genre is not a polarized dichotomy at all (Cao 2007: 8). Wolff 
(2011: 233) admits that no one has offered a comprehensive and 
distinctive definition of what constitutes a legal text so far, and 
however, the definition is solely useful to create legal-translation 
theories, which can seldom be applied by practitioners in 
consideration of the fact that many texts a “legal-translator” translates 
and certifies (e.g.: descriptive part of a summons, degree certificates, 
medical reports, …) do not fit current definitions of legal texts. 
                                                        
21For a more in-depth analysis of the translation into Mandarin of documents used in 
the Italian lawsuit, please refer to D’Attoma and Mannoni 2016. 
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Translators who do not find the relief on a more 
comprehensive and encompassing theory cannot but fall into the 
captivating light of the literalists’ creed: stuck in the old debate on free 
Vs. literal translation, when in doubt, they would choose the allegedly 
most faithful, precise, word-for-word (as the WES put it), literal 
translation. The second common opinion this paper challenged is the 
presumed utility of literal translation, which considering the fact that 
the very notion of literality has no meaning at all, I proved to be 
useless and with no scientific foundation whatsoever. This was 
demonstrated by examples showing that “literal” cannot intend the 
meaning resulting from the meaning of a word’s letters, nor can intend 
etymologically-related words in L2 (otherwise Mandarin Chinese 
could not be translated into English, as a word such as dangshiren 
does not have any etymologically-related word in the target language). 
So “literal” just means “the most common translation and 
interpretation other people give to a word”. 
By abandoning the old cliché on free Vs. literal translation 
and all the text-genre related theories, a more comprehensive theory 
should be used. In this paper, I introduced and supported Popovič’s 
semiotics translation theory, which gives great space to personal 
interpretation and anisomorphism, and makes us definitely abandon 
the concept of faithfulness and equivalence in translation. Faithful and 
objective translations cannot exist, as translation is proved to be 
a subjective act: it is a creative process for which the interpreter is 
called to give his own interpretation on the signs created within the 
text. The metatext cannot be thought to be the same text as prototext, 
since the metatext is a brand new text assuming just almost the same 
meaning (Eco 2003) Translation is hence a non-repeatable process. 
What Harvey (2002: 180) affirms by quoting Hammond’s words is 
true: a translator is not a bilingual typist; he is a text producer, 
combining artistic creativity with scientific research. 
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